110 年 國立臺灣大學哲學系碩士班甲組《哲學英文》
第 1 題25 分
Read the passage and answer the questions in your own words (Chinese is fine) (25%)
The transformation at the heart of the Zhuangzi, then, is not necessarily or primarily a moral transformation. It is
primarily a transformation in how one thinks and feels about the world, and in the behavior that expresses this.
A key assumption is that even someone who loyally complies with all of the major recognized social norms, a
"good" person, can have an inadequate and unsatisfying style of life, and should be motivated to transform herself
or himself. There may be cases, of course, in which someone's inadequate and unsatisfying life includes what we
would term immorality, and that enlightenment would have as one of its byproducts the elimination of the
motivation for this immorality. This is not precluded by the Zhuangzi, but as far as I can see the work does not
advertise increased moral virtue as one of the possible rewards of transformation.
Q1 What is the author's main point? (15%)
Q2 How do the lines of thought starting with "a key assumption" and "there may be cases, of course" contribute
to the main point? (10%)
Kupperman, Joel (1996). "Spontaneity and Education of the Emotions." Kjellberg, Paul and Philip J. Ivanhoe
(eds.). Essays on Skepticism, Relativism, and Ethics in the Zhuangzi. Albany: State University of New York Press.
(p. 188)
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核心觀念
本文區分兩種轉化:一種以提升道德德性為中心;另一種則是改變人看待、感受世界的方式,並改變由此表現出的行為。作者認為,《莊子》所關注的轉化主要屬於後者,因此不應把它簡化為道德改善或道德修養。
解題方法
先抓首句的主張,再看後文如何限定、支持它。首句指出,《莊子》核心的轉化「不一定、也不主要」是道德轉化,而主要是思想、情感與行為方式的改變。後文的兩段推論,分別說明為何這種轉化有其必要,以及它與道德改善的關係。
Q1:作者的主要論點
作者主張,《莊子》所重視的核心轉化,主要不是使人成為更有道德的人,而是改變人思考與感受世界的方式,並使行為也隨之改變。這種轉化可能伴隨道德上的改善,但道德德性並非作者認為《莊子》明確宣示的主要成果。
Q2:兩段思路如何支持主要論點
第 2 題25 分
Translate the following passage in fluent Chinese (25%)
The other way in which Chinese realism differs is that its underlying theory of language has no clear counterpart
to the familiar conceptual structure of Western semantics. We find no concepts of beliefs, concepts, ideas,
thoughts, meanings, or truths. Mohist thinkers create realist semantics out of the project of finding constant
guiding discourse [...] Their analyses use the pragmatic term ke (admissible) as pivotally as Western analyses use
truth. [...] The deep concern continues to be guidance, not description.
Hansen, Chad (1992). A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought: A Philosophical Interpretation. Oxford/New York:
Oxford University Press. (p. 235)
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這是一道翻譯題,要求將英文段落流暢地翻譯成中文。
核心觀念:
考驗考生對於哲學術語的理解,以及將英文學術文本精確且流暢地翻譯成中文的能力。
解題思路:
- 逐句理解原文: 確保理解每個句子及其語意。
- "The other way in which Chinese realism differs is that its underlying theory of language has no clear counterpart to the familiar conceptual structure of Western semantics."
- "Chinese realism":中國的實在論。
- "underlying theory of language":語言的基礎理論。
- "no clear counterpart":沒有明確的對應物/對比。
- "familiar conceptual structure of Western semantics":西方語義學中熟悉的概念結構。
- 整體意思:中國實在論的另一種不同之處在於,其語言基礎理論與西方語義學中熟悉的概念結構沒有明確的對應。
- "We find no concepts of beliefs, concepts, ideas, thoughts, meanings, or truths."
- 這裡列舉了西方語義學中常見的幾個核心概念,作者聲稱在中國語境中找不到對應。
- "Mohist thinkers create realist semantics out of the project of finding constant guiding discourse [...]"
- "Mohist thinkers":墨家思想家。
- "create realist semantics":建構實在論的語義學。
- "out of the project of finding":基於尋找...的目標/計畫。
- "constant guiding discourse":持續指導性的言談/論述。
- 整體意思:墨家思想家透過尋找持續指導性的言談,來建構實在論的語義學。
- "Their analyses use the pragmatic term ke (admissible) as pivotally as Western analyses use truth."
- "pragmatic term ke (admissible)":實用主義的術語「可許」(ke,意為可接受的、允許的)。
- "pivotally as":如同...一樣關鍵地/核心地。
- "The other way in which Chinese realism differs is that its underlying theory of language has no clear counterpart to the familiar conceptual structure of Western semantics."
第 3 題50 分
請盡可能照字面上地(literally)翻譯以下段落(40%),並且簡要說明此段落的主旨為何(10%)。總分50分
案:此處為現象學家Dan Zahavi 批評兩位佛教學者 Dreyfus 和 Albahari認為自我(self)不存在的主張。
引文出自 Dan Zahavi, "The Experiential Self: Objections and Clarifications," in Mark Siderits, Evan Thompson
and Dan Zahavi, eds., Self, No Self? Perspectives from Analytical, Phenomenological, & Indian Traditions.
Oxford University Press, 2016.
"Let me divide my critical rejoinder into three parts.
- First of all, I reject the univocal definition of self provided by Dreyfus and Albahari. Both are very confident
in spelling out what a self is, and after having defined it, they then proceed to deny its existence. In my view,
however, the definition they provide is overly simplistic. There is no doubt that some people have defended the
notion of self that Albahari and Dreyfus operate with, but I would dispute the claim that their notion is the default
notion, that is, that it is either a particularly classical notion of self or that it is a particularly commonsensical
notion, that is, one that is part of our folk psychology. Consider again the claim that the self-if it exists-is some
kind of ontologically independent invariant principle of identity that stands apart from, and above, the stream of
changing experiences; something that remains unchanging from birth to death; something that remains entirely
unaffected by language acquisition, social relationships, major life events, personal commitments, projects, and
values, something that cannot develop or flourish nor be disturbed or shattered. Frankly, I don't see such a notion
as being very much in line with our pre-philosophical, everyday understanding of who we are. As for the claim
that the definition captures the (rather than a) traditional philosophical understanding of self, this is also
something I would dispute. Just consider, to take some (not entirely) randomly chosen examples: the accounts
we find in Aristotle or Montaigne (for informative historical overviews, cf. Sorabji 2006, Seigel 2005). In any
case, when comparing the definition of self provided by Albahari and Dreyfus to the definitions found in
contemporary discussions of self, it will immediately be evident that the latter discussions are far more complex,
and far more equivocal, and that there are far more notions of self at play, including notions of ecological,
experiential, dialogical, narrative, relational, embodied, and socially constructed selves. This complexity is
ignored by Albahari and Dreyfus, and they thereby fail to realize that many of the contemporary notions of self-
including those employed by most empirical researchers currently interested in the development, structure,
function, and pathology of self-are quite different from the concept they criticize. To mention just one discipline
that can exemplify this, consider developmental psychology and the work of developmental psychologists such
as Stern (1985), Neisser (1988), Rochat (2001), Hobson (2002), or Reddy (2008). Thus, rather than saying that
the self does not exist, I think self-skeptics should settle for a far more modest claim. They should qualify their
statement and instead deny the existence of a special kind of self."
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這題包含翻譯(40%)和主旨說明(10%),總分50%。
核心觀念:
這題考驗考生對英文哲學文本的字面翻譯能力,以及對論證內容的理解和提煉主旨的能力。特別是關於「自我」(self)的哲學討論,涉及現象學、佛學、分析哲學等不同傳統。
解題思路:
Part 1: 字面翻譯 (40%)
- 仔細閱讀原文,分段理解:
- "Let me divide my critical rejoinder into three parts."
- "critical rejoinder":批判性的回應/反駁。
- 翻譯:讓我將我的批判性回應分成三部分。
- "1. First of all, I reject the univocal definition of self provided by Dreyfus and Albahari."
- "univocal definition":單一語義的定義、單義的定義。
- 翻譯:首先,我拒絕 Dreyfus 和 Albahari 所提供的關於自我的單義定義。
- "Both are very confident in spelling out what a self is, and after having defined it, they then proceed to deny its existence."
- "spelling out":詳盡說明、闡明。
- 翻譯:他們兩人都對闡明什麼是自我非常有信心,並在定義了它之後,接著就否定它的存在。
- "In my view, however, the definition they provide is overly simplistic."
- "overly simplistic":過於簡化、過於簡單。
- 翻譯:然而,依我看來,他們所提供的定義過於簡化了。
- "There is no doubt that some people have defended the notion of self that Albahari and Dreyfus operate with, but I would dispute the claim that their notion is the default notion, that is, that it is either a particularly classical notion of self or that it is a particularly commonsensical notion, that is, one that is part of our folk psychology."
- "operate with":採用、使用、處理。
- "default notion":預設的概念、預設的觀念。
- "particularly classical notion":特別是古典的觀念。
- "particularly commonsensical notion":特別是合乎常識的觀念。
- "folk psychology":民間心理學。
- 翻譯:毫無疑問,有些人確實捍衛了 Albahari 和 Dreyfus 所採用的那種自我的觀念,但我會質疑他們的觀念是「預設的觀念」這一主張,也就是說,質疑它是一個特別古典的自我觀念,或者是一個特別合乎常識的觀念,亦即是我們民間心理學的一部分。
- "Consider again the claim that the self-if it exists-is some kind of ontologically independent invariant principle of identity that stands apart from, and above, the stream of changing experiences; something that remains unchanging from birth to death; something that remains entirely unaffected by language acquisition, social relationships, major life events, personal commitments, projects, and values, something that cannot develop or flourish nor be disturbed or shattered."
- "ontologically independent invariant principle of identity":本體論上獨立的不變的同一性原則。
- "stands apart from, and above":獨立於,且高於。
- "stream of changing experiences":變動經驗的流。
- "unaffected by":不受...影響。
- "language acquisition":語言習得。
- "social relationships":社會關係。
- "major life events":重大的生活事件。
- "personal commitments, projects, and values":個人承諾、計畫和價值觀。
- "develop or flourish":發展或蓬勃發展。
- "disturbed or shattered":被干擾或被粉碎。
- 翻譯:再考慮一下這個主張:自我——如果它存在的話——是一種本體論上獨立的不變同一性原則,它獨立於、並高於變動經驗的流;一種從出生到死亡都保持不變的東西;一種完全不受語言習得、社會關係、重大生活事件、個人承諾、計畫和價值觀影響的東西;一種不能發展或蓬勃發展,也不能被干擾或粉碎的東西。
- "Frankly, I don't see such a notion as being very much in line with our pre-philosophical, everyday understanding of who we are."
- "pre-philosophical":前哲學的。
- "everyday understanding":日常理解。
- "in line with":與...一致。
- 翻譯:坦白說,我認為這種觀念與我們前哲學的、日常的自我理解,並沒有非常一致。
- "As for the claim that the definition captures the (rather than a) traditional philosophical understanding of self, this is also something I would dispute."
- "captures the (rather than a)":捕捉到的是「那個」(而非「一個」)...。這裡強調的是,Dreyfus和Albahari聲稱他們定義的是「傳統哲學對自我的理解」,而不是「傳統哲學對自我的某種理解」。
- "traditional philosophical understanding":傳統哲學的理解。
- 翻譯:至於「他們的定義捕捉到了(而非僅僅是捕捉到了一個)傳統哲學對自我的理解」這一主張,這也是我會質疑的地方。
- "Just consider, to take some (not entirely) randomly chosen examples: the accounts we find in Aristotle or Montaigne (for informative historical overviews, cf. Sorabji 2006, Seigel 2005)."
- "accounts":論述、說法。
- "cf." (confer):參見。
- 翻譯:僅以一些(並非完全隨機挑選的)例子來說:我們在亞里斯多德或蒙田的論述中所發現的(若要了解具體的歷史概述,請參見 Sorabji 2006, Seigel 2005)。
- "In any case, when comparing the definition of self provided by Albahari and Dreyfus to the definitions found in contemporary discussions of self, it will immediately be evident that the latter discussions are far more complex, and far more equivocal, and that there are far more notions of self at play, including notions of ecological, experiential, dialogical, narrative, relational, embodied, and socially constructed selves."
- "contemporary discussions of self":當代關於自我的討論。
- "immediately be evident":立即會顯而易見。
- "latter discussions":後者(當代)的討論。
- "far more complex, and far more equivocal":更加複雜,也更加含糊不清。
- "notions of self at play":正在運作的、存在的自我觀念。
- "Let me divide my critical rejoinder into three parts."