111 年 國立政治大學臺灣史研究所《歷史文獻解讀》

以下史料是1972年修訂的動員戡亂時期臨時條款,請閱讀後,回答下面的問題。

(一) 總統根據此一修訂後的臨時條款,自己可以動用哪些原本憲法沒有的權限? (10分)
(二) 增額中央民意代表與第一屆中央民意代表的關係為何? (10分)
(三) 1978年12月由於美國宣布即將與中華人民共和國建交,不再承認中華民國政府,導致政府宣布停止當年的增額中央民意代表選舉。請問其依據為何? (5分)

茲依照憲法第一百七十四條第一款程序,制定動員戡亂時期臨時條款如左:

一、 總統在動員戡亂時期,為避免國家或人民遭遇緊急危難,或應付財政經濟上重大變故,得經行政院會議之決議,為緊急處分,不受憲法第三十九條或第四十三條所規定程序之限制。
二、 前項緊急處分,立法院得依憲法第五十七條第二款規定之程序變更或廢止之。
三、 動員戡亂時期,總統副總統得連選連任,不受憲法第四十七條連任次之限制。
四、 動員戡亂時期本憲政體制授權總統得設置動員戡亂機構,決定動員戡亂有關大政方針,並處理戰地政務。
五、 總統為適應動員戡亂需要,得調整中央政府之行政機構,人事機構及其組織。
六、 動員戡亂時期,總統得依下列規定,訂頒辦法充實中央民意代表機構,不受憲法第二十六條、第六十四條及第九十一條之限制:
(一) 在自由地區增加中央民意代表名額,定期選舉,其須由僑居國外國民選出之立法委員及監察委員,事實上不能辦理選舉者,得由總統訂定辦法遴選之。
(二) 第一屆中央民意代表,係經全國人民選舉所產生,依法行使職權,其增選、補選者亦同。大陸光復地區次第辦理中央民意代表之選舉。
(三) 增加名額選出之中央民意代表,與第一屆中央民意代表,依法行使職權。
增加名額選出之國民大會代表,每六年改選,立法委員每三年改選,監察委員每六年改選。
七、 動員戡亂時期,國民大會得制定辦法,創制中央法律原則與複決中央法律,不受憲法第二十七條第二項之限制。
八、 在戡亂時期,總統對於創制案或複決案認為有必要時,得召集國民大會臨時會討論之。
九、 國民大會於閉會期間,設置研究機構,研討憲政有關問題。
十、 動員戡亂時期之終止,由總統宣告之。
十一、臨時條款之修訂或廢止,由國民大會決定之。

二、 以下史料是陳誠呈蔣中正「充實臺幣發行準備辦法」,請閱讀後,回答下列的問題。
(一) 陳誠為什麼反對中央政府匯款到台灣支付軍隊在台的費用? (5分) 這和中央政府決定的金圓券和台幣的匯率有什麼關係? (10分)
(二) 中央政府在台經營的國營企業為何會影響台灣的通貨膨脹? (10分)

以下史料是1922年臺灣議會設置請願運動之「臺灣議會設置請願理由書」(漢文版)。試述本史料以何理由要求台灣議會之設置。(25分)

(一) 臺灣特別立法之由來
臺灣乃日清戰爭之結果,依據明治二十八年四月十七日,在下關所締結之媾和條約,由清國割讓日本之太平洋上一孤島,面積三千五百九十七方料,現在之在住人口:屬於大和民族的內地人士四萬八千人,屬於漢民族的本島人三百四十一萬三千人,馬來種族的山地人八萬六千人,其他外國人二萬一千餘人,合計三百六十六萬九千餘人,實為日本帝國確立南進政策之重要門戶。對此帝國南方之門戶——臺灣,三百年來由福建、廣東移住之漢民族,應以何種政治組織統治之,實乃決定日本帝國對於新領土經營之終局的成功之根本問題。
治臺初期百事草創,而在清朝治下三百餘年間,固有的文化、制度及漢民族四千餘年來之特殊民情、習慣,究有不能施行與日本內地同一法令之原因存在,統治上認為有施行特別制度之必要。
理論上,日本帝國為立憲法治國家,是故臺灣之特別統治制度亦須準據立憲法治之原則。然因當時民心尚未歸一,地方秩序尚未安定,在此情況下,認為難以遵由日本內地所施行立憲政治之常軌,付與新附島民以政治參與權為理由,乃以明治二十九年法律第六十三號,付與臺灣總督得發佈與法律同一效力之命令權。即畀與行政官之臺灣總督以帝國議會之立法權,且基於該委任立法,總督可以律令制定法院條例。其結果遂使行政、立法、司法三權在制度上歸於總督一人之手。其後明治三十九年,雖以法律第三十一號,文面上多少加以修正,又大正十年以法律第三號,表面上似有縮小特別立法之範圍,然「臺灣特殊事情」根深蒂固,由來已久,不但不因法文之修改而減少其存在之意義,即在今後亦永無消滅之時期。是故臺灣特別立法之根據,絕非經過一定期間便能自動消滅者。
臺灣改隸以來,已經二十八星霜,臺灣之特殊民情習慣依然存在,此雖為臺灣當局從來極力主張之特別立法之根據,但不能以此而否定立憲政治準用於臺灣,蓋在治臺初期,一如上述,為啟導民心之歸向,保持地方安寧,總督或有示其絕對威力之必要,然今則百政已就其緒,秩序整齊,顯然與現代立憲制度背馳之政治,已失去其繼續存在於臺灣的根據了。此認吾等臺灣人對帝國議會所提出之臺灣議會設置請願,實基於臺灣民眾之政治自覺,且具有現代立憲思想之合理根據,乃國民之正當要求者,用特懇祈朝野諸賢之諒察。

(二) 付予臺灣人民特別參政權之必要
立憲政治在歐美文明諸國,大為發達,已成為今日世界共通之真理與人類共存所必需之要件,而其理想,乃以自覺之民眾輿論為基礎。立法依據代議制度,行政依據地方自治制度,司法依據陪審制度,各賦與國民參政權,旨在圖謀完全之國利民福。唯參政權付與之程度,固應視人民發達之狀況,不無多少之差,然絕無獨讓本國人專有而
不使殖民地人民參與之理。日本本國近來熱烈要求之普通選舉,中央政府不視為非法運動,臺灣住民對臺灣特別立法要求參與之權,亦屬正當合理之行為。
關於臺灣住民參與立法之時期如何,固不無多少之爭論,但如上面所述,臺灣今日之社會狀態,業已經過必須維持行政立法合一制度之時期。尤其歐洲大戰後,在巴黎會議締結國際聯盟條約,促進文明諸國之外交內治各有根本革新,又為開發落後地區人民之福祉,確立殖民地統治之新原則。最近在華盛頓會議又縮小三大強國之海軍,締結四國協商條約,協定太平洋防備。因此外觀上世界恆久之和平,雖似可保持。但若一度窺察各國社會之內部,則又可看到彼等弱小民族莫不強調民眾政治,高唱人道主義,要求自由解放,主張社會改造之聲甚為囂張,然則人類社會之前途似尚未可遽以樂觀。
當此世界變局,苟為日本帝國國民者,正應外對友邦和親,內圖國民一致,以鞏固國基,進而貢獻世界文化與人類和平之時。若然,則日本對臺灣三百六十餘萬民眾,不能不使其完成由於其地理上之關係助成帝國南方之發展,由於其歷史上之關係促進日華兩民族親善之重大使命,因此首先應於臺灣準據立憲政治之本義,促成種族之待遇均等為急務者固不待言。倘若一如從來之統治組織,總督一面為立法機關制定律令,一面又為行政機關而予以執行,且以自己命令所設之法院而加以維持,釀成一人隨心所欲,掌有生殺予奪之全權。如遇公正嚴明之總督,其弊害或
者不大,然而回想過去,惹起種種不祥事件之原因,則其為不宜更予存續之制度豈非甚明。是故如斯非立憲制度,抑制人權,閉塞民意,徒使新附民隱忍鬱積或流於自暴自棄,則難保將來於東洋發展史上留下汙點,從而使帝國之殖民地統治之功虧於一簣。緣此今次臺灣住民要求付與合理的特別參政權於帝國議會實係適應時勢之國民的熱誠之表露也。

(三) 臺灣議會設置之要旨
基於以上所述,臺灣特別立法之必要,今後亦將永久存續,且依據立憲政治之常道,使臺灣住民參與特別立法之時機亦已來臨,吾人鑑於帝國負有維護東洋和平之國際地位,徵於世界時潮動盪之現下情勢,維繫臺灣民心最適善之統治方策,除予臺灣住民參與特別立法外,並無其他方法。去年對帝國議會請願設置臺灣民選議會,本年仍再提出。臺灣議會,不問其為日本人、為臺灣人、抑或為行政區域內之熟蕃人,凡居住臺灣者,均以公選之代表者,組
織為協贊施行於臺灣特別法律及臺灣預算之特別代議機關。故如屬日本臺灣共通性質之立法事項,仍屬帝國議會,
僅將實際上帝國議會所不能代辦之有關臺灣特殊事情之立法部份屬於臺灣議會而已。如此臺灣議會設置之目的,限
於有關臺灣特殊事情之立法,雖不無不夠徹底之嫌,然吾人鑑於現在情況,於不妨礙臺灣發達之最小範圍內暫予滿足。又有調既已認定臺灣有公布特別代議制度之必要,何不百尺竿頭更進一步,要求如英國自治領紐西蘭、澳洲等,
具有完全立法議會與責任內閣之殖民地自治耶?徵於歐戰後發達之民族精神,此種議論理論上未始無當,唯吾人依
照臺灣實際現狀,未能遽以左袒如斯之議論也。

(四) 對臺灣議會設置反對論之辯明
吾人之臺灣議會設置運動,由日本帝國而言乃係適應世界趨勢,準據立憲之精神,合乎臺灣島民趨向,在恰當
的程度要求以特別代議制度代替之特別參政權,毫無叛離之意思,蓋欲盡最善之天職而表露其熱枕而已。然而吾人
之苦衷,未被諒察,朝野人士中不無反對論者,茲試以簡單之辯,以仰公明嚴正之謀國諸賢之指教。
有以臺灣現在之特別立法,應予撤廢,遲早必由臺灣住民選出帝國議會之代議士與日本內地作一律之立法,無
需特設臺灣議會之反對論。然而基於臺灣島民特殊之文化制度,民風慣習,二十餘年來臺灣當局極力所維持之特別
立法,為何當初不得撤廢,而反在經過臺灣舊慣調查會,充分調查社會上、經濟上諸制度,且已成立合法的「慣習
法」之後,而始謂可予破壞耶,實令人不能無惑焉。
退一步假定,將來在帝國議會中,認為可以制定有關臺灣之特別立法,亦不過使大多數不通臺灣特殊事情之國
會議員,訂立與其本身無直接利害關係之制度而已,實屬不明現代立憲民意代表政治之立論也。試詳言之:日本內
地選出之議員不通於臺灣事情,對於實際之知識及經驗,不但淺薄,而且不如臺灣選出議員對其利害關係有痛切之
感。因此遇有關臺灣統治之根本重大議案提出,如其提案與多數臺灣住民之意見相反之時,該議員尤其執政多數黨
之議員,為欲擁護政府,必重視當局之意,少數臺灣議員之意見,勢必被漠視,此乃淺明之道理也。
果然如此,雖謂給與臺灣住民參政權,乃不能維護臺灣本身之利益,結果成為有名無實之參政權,反而造成日
本臺灣間永久紛爭之因。加之臺灣選出之議員與內地選出之議員,因社會上及經濟上各種事情迥異,致如內地發生
問題時,因不通其實情,且任何決定,均與臺灣無關,其能採取中立態度者尚佳,甚至成為議員爭奪或收買之目標,
因而更有貽禍政治之危險。故吾人請願設置適應臺灣事情之特別立法機關,要求確立名實俱全之制度在理論上抑或
在實際上,乃極合理之主張也。
又有以憲法上帝國內限定一個立法議會,不許兩個以上之存在,故謂為臺灣設立特別立法議會為違反憲法之反
對論。竊惟理論上憲法是否施行於臺灣,在今日之學說尚未有定論,而實際上大部分之憲法明文未見施行於臺灣亦
屬不爭之事實。假如憲法全部施行於臺灣,然則向來憲法上之立法事項,以臺灣總督之律令權,全般委任於行政機
關之總督,顯然不但違反憲法明文,亦背馳立憲三權分立之根本精神。臺灣之特殊事情既不能與日本內地一律立法,
而明知行政機關兼辦立法為違反憲法,僅為認定政治上有此必要而准予委任,則更無不可設立合乎憲法精神之代議
機關而使之立法。何況憲法應與時代同其推移進化者。故此種反對論者,可謂只知固有之舊日本,而不知膨脹發展
之新形勢。
尚有從殖民政策上標榜本國延長之主義,而欲推行其不徹底之同化政策,以作反對吾人之臺灣議會設置運動者。
在嚴格的意味,同化政策係對歷史、信念、民情、習慣迥異之臺灣悉如日本內地各府縣而統治之,且施行內地社會
所行之全部法令,務將臺灣人固有之特性消滅混合統一之。然而凡抹殺民族之歷史,勢必使其盲從本國之思想習慣,
如此不但不自然而且必至無視其發達所需要之社會要求。此在本國移民比較殖民地土著人為多之地方強行之,或可收幾分效果,然在文化歷史相當發達之地方,如欲強行之,必將成為激發反感之
原因,此為古今史實所證明者。故在一方面標榜同化政策,在他方面又不得不固持特別特度,如遇統治上有必要時,
則摹仿本國制度,不利時則採用特別制度,此乃出於臨機應變之本國本位主義,絕對不能在統治臺灣上結成美果,
亦確信絕非賢明之政策。以下列舉世界殖民國同化政策之功過史實,以資闡明臺灣特別立法機關設置之正當理由。
查採用同化政策之先進殖民國為法國,法國基於大革命後自由平等之精神,確立同化政策,將殖民地視為本國
之延長,由各殖民地選出代表議員於本國議會。然近來因時勢推移,並徵於多年之經驗,懷疑同化政策之價值者漸
多,現正徐徐在變化中,亞爾及利亞本與法國為不可分之領土,排斥土著之家族或種族制度,禁止土地共有,適用
法本國之森林法等,勵行同化主義之政策。但其結果反而被認為紊亂其社會組織,乃至於咒詛法國政府。尤其前世
紀末葉以還,對同化政策出現有力之反對說,又在印度支那及其他殖民地遭受到失敗,使得法國輿論,對同化政策
抱不安之念。加之一八九八年列茲尼爾氏提議廢止交趾支那,法屬印度所選出參加法國議之代表者,一九○○年印
度支那總督魯明氏,亦在其殖民大臣之報告書中,極論立法上及社會上同化政策均係有害無益。而法國政府同年為
促殖民地財政獨立之目的,制定新財政法,將來包括在本國財政中之亞爾及利亞財政撥開,使其獨立。亞爾及利亞
以外之法國殖民地,除去二三保護國外,多數均以同化制度與自治制度並行,殖民地住民,對本國議會選出代議士,
同時殖民地本身的內政則在一定範圍內付與殖民地議會議決之權能。由此可見法國因鑑於過去同化政策之失敗,漸
次在承認自治之制度,以法國之自由平等,民主共和之政治傳統去統治殖民地推行同化政策,尚不能收充分之效果,
其他僅藉同化政策之美名,實則強行高壓政策而失敗者之多,更不足為怪矣。
例如德國曾合併法屬「亞耳沙斯、洛林」,四十餘年間,對該二州住民為使其德國化,小學校禁止教授法語,抹
殺法國經營該州二百餘年之歷史,且以種種高壓手段,欲消除其國民性,結果反助長該二州住民之反抗心,益加思
念法國,一九一一年為懷柔起見,制定自治新憲法,亦不足收攬二州之人心。而今次大戰中新獨立之烏克蘭,數百
年間,在俄羅斯強制同化政策下,烏克蘭語書本被禁印刷,烏克蘭語學校全部被關閉,凡足以追懷以烏克蘭國民之
事物,悉遭撲滅,甚至絕對禁止烏克蘭語,但烏克蘭雖被殘酷之同化手段所苦而終於獨立。又從來被認為英國本土
之延長的愛爾蘭,其住民之大部分為「蓋爾」人種,信眾羅馬舊教,自一八○一年愛爾蘭議會併合後,受種種不平
等待遇,結果愛爾蘭選出之議員組織愛爾蘭自治黨,雖不脫離英國,而對英國議會要求完全之自治制度。其一八八
五年之內閣,有所考慮,毅然提出愛爾蘭自治案,然遭反對黨之攻擊,內閣瓦解,邇來三十餘年間,該自治案三次
通過下院,雖悉被上院否決,但今次大戰後一九一九年十二月終見上下兩院。然因南部羅馬教徒之「新芬」黨,要
求獨立,不滿意自治法案,於是英國政府有鑑於時局,乃以妥協互讓之精神,去年於倫敦與「新芬」黨代表會商,
經過種種折衝之結果,終於年前十二月中協定成功,成立愛爾蘭自由國,予以完全自治殖民地之地位。由於英愛雙
方之大讓步,一百二十年來之最大禍患——愛爾蘭問題———亦因英國首相魯意佐治與「新芬」黨代表者克里富費斯
氏非凡經世之手腕,獲得妥當公正之解決,此實為英帝國歷史上最大之功績也。
依照上舉數例,強制性同化政策,終必失敗喪失其屬領,而穩健之自治不但成功,且益增強其國運,此乃可得
推論之事實,而藉此失敗不徹底之同化主義,用以反對僅可稱為自治準備行之臺灣議會設置運動,豈係對日本帝國
忠實者之所應為乎。

(五) 結論
綜合上述,臺灣係具有特殊歷史之地區,不但不可與沖繩、北海道同論,人口比英國殖民地「紐・華雪蘭〔New
Selangor〕」之二十六萬人,紐西蘭之一百二十萬人尚多,面積比比利時之二千四百十五方籽,荷蘭本土之二千七十
四方料尚廣。
現時以日本之威力,開拓利用此島,似無何等困難,但如何能夠使臺灣三百六十萬人民,心悅誠服於日本帝國
仁政,實非容易之問題。吾人鑑於臺灣現狀與帝國政體及世界思潮,為使臺灣住民發揮特殊使命,首先認有付與特
別參政權之必要,同時由於帝國百年之大計,切望臺灣統治方策,不可採用註定失敗而不徹底之同化政策。一面尤
望臺灣當局向來所維持之特別立法,切宜適應時勢,依據立憲精神而行,以利臺灣住民之福祉,而促其發達,庶幾
可收臺灣統治之終局的成功。是乃此次敢向帝國議會請願設置臺灣民選特別議會之原因,凡衷心企望帝國強大之人
士,自須氣宇宏大,必能以吾人之合法要求為諒,確認臺灣由於言語風習之不同,而尊重其正當權利也。

以下文獻探討美國對台灣海峽政策的戰略模糊(Strategic Ambiguity)。假定美國的對台海政策為戰略模糊,請引據此文獻,論述美國採取此政策的原因。(25分)

Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China, pp. 13-17.
Made changes to some parts of the text.

Truman's successor, Dwight Eisenhower, wanted to use the Nationalist presence across the Strait to threaten
China and accelerate a settlement in Korea. The US became Taiwan's primary source of assistance, which allowed
Chiang Kai-shek to stabilize KMT* rule and refurbish the armed forces. Chiang then began to press for a mutual
defense treaty, only to discover that supposedly sympathetic leaders in Washington did not want to give it to him.
China emerged as the key to Chiang's treaty much as Mao Zedong's support for North Korea's attack in June
1950 had been the answer to regime survival. In September 1954 Mao shelled Jinmen, an island off China's coast
still under Nationalist control. He did not hope to seize it, lacking the capability. He did intend to deter a defense
treaty, create friction between Washington and Taipei, and force the international community to pay attention to
the Taiwan issue. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, however, concluded that the crisis left him no other choice
but, grudgingly*, to sign the treaty.

Although now in a formal alliance with Taipei, Americans did not embrace the KMT government uncritically.
The mutual defense treaty provided the KMT urgently needed support, but it also gave Washington the ability to
circumscribe, if not prevent, Nationalist Chinese risk taking. Chiang, for instance, desperately wanted to safeguard
not only Taiwan and the Penghu Islands but also Jinmen and Mazu. The State Department refused. Rather than
offer an explicit pledge, Washington would say only that, in extremis, coverage might extend to "such other
territories as may be determined by mutual agreement." At Eisenhower's behest, Congress bolstered the assurance
with the Formosa Resolution in 1955, authorizing the president to assist the Nationalists in defending Taiwan,
Penghu, and unspecified "related positions."

The confrontation with China dragged into March, and the Eisenhower team began to talk, privately and
publicly, about using atomic weapons to end it. How influential these threats were in Beijing's decision to renounce
its misadventure remains uncertain. Washington's atomic diplomacy may have been more important in fortifying
Taipei. Zhou Enlai went to the April 1955 Bandung Conference seeking support from the "third world," but he
recognized that the Strait crisis wasn't winning Beijing friends. He softened China's position, and diplomatic talks
with the US followed, along with the end of the confrontation.

It is clear that the 1954-55 Taiwan Strait crisis had three fundamental, long-term effects on US-Taiwan-China
interaction. Washington's attempted nuclear intimidation of Beijing led Mao to develop China's atomic capability,
raising the stakes of confrontation. Second, Washington's difficulties controlling its ally and deterring its adversary
produced the enduring, if sometimes reviled, policy of strategic ambiguity. Eisenhower and Dulles judged that it
was hazardous to tell Beijing exactly which territories Washington would defend because the People's Liberation
Army (PLA) would seize the rest. At the same time, they refused to clarify the extent of their assistance lest Chiang
Kai-shek become overconfident and produce a new crisis. Strategic ambiguity also allowed Eisenhower to defend
himself against an intrusive Congress. Third, Taipei concluded that its approach to relations with Washington was
working. As had happened on the mainland in the 1940s, Washington might be angered and it might not grant the
KMT unlimited support, but, lacking alternatives, it would ultimately stand by the Republic of China. It would do
so even when KMT behavior jeopardized American interests and security.

So, largely unchastened* by the Strait crisis, Chiang repeatedly reached for more than America was prepared
to bestow*. He urged Washington to help him establish an Asian defense association to parallel the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization. He suggested to a series of American presidents that ROC soldiers could help fight in Vietnam
as he had earlier, unsuccessfully, offered to assist in Korea, eager for the prestige of marching alongside Americans.
More important, he tried to persuade US officials to see attacks against Communist China as necessary extensions
of their existing battle plans. Bringing down Mao was vital to sustaining peace in Asia.

Washington, however, dismissed Nationalist forces as inadequate, fit for nothing more than reconnaissance
or commando raids*, and likely to be a burden rather than an asset in serious fighting. Still, neutralizing Taiwan
would not serve US strategic interests and was specifically disavowed in 1953. Indeed, the mere existence of ROC
forces tied down PLA units, and since the entire cost of annual economic and military assistance to Taiwan equaled
no more than the price of equipping and feeding a single US division at home, it seemed a bargain. As for Chiang's
motives, US leaders became ever more convinced that Chiang cared little about containment of the Soviet bloc, but
rather wanted to embroil the US in a war with China to facilitate the KMT's return to the mainland. After the 1954-
55 crisis, far from removing his troops from islands within range of Chinese artillery, he had tripled their numbers.

The US did not jettison* the Kuomintang and Taiwan in spite of this friction. Dulles's ire* always passed, and
the continuing propaganda allure of a Free China kept critical American diplomats at bay. Indeed, Dulles and
Eisenhower both remained chary of the China lobby, especially in Congress. Neither man could doubt that for them
to lose Taiwan, as their predecessors had "lost China," would be politically costly.

Washington also feared that its credibility as a friend and ally would be undermined by abandonment of Taipei.
In particular, to bolster policies of "brinkmanship" and "massive retaliation," Dulles and others believed there could
be no doubts about US resolve to act in a crisis. Nor could Washington allow the PRC to rupture the US defensive
perimeter, thereby exposing sea-lanes vital for trade and military traffic or leaving Asian friends suddenly
vulnerable.

In 1958 the US, having been unable to persuade Chiang Kai-shek to reduce his exposure on the offshore
islands, responded to renewed PRC shelling by sending warships again. Washington installed eight-inch howitzers*
Jon Jinmen capable of hitting China with atomic shells and provided the first Sidewinder air-to-air missiles to be
used in combat. Mao-who sought to drive Chiang from the islands, test US determination, energize domestic
reform, and challenge domination of the international order by Washington and Moscow-admitted to having
been shocked by the US response. "I simply did not calculate... that the world would become so disturbed and
turbulent," he later observed. He renounced his hopes of capturing Jinmen and Mazu, realizing that increasing the
geographic distance between the mainland and Taiwan would contribute to the creation of two Chinas.

Having backed Chiang forcefully, Dulles nonetheless distrusted him and told the press on September 30, 1958,
that it would be foolhardy to sustain large deployments on the precarious offshore islands if a cease-fire could be
negotiated. Dulles compelled Chiang to agree to a communiqué declaring that Taiwan would rely on political means
to recover the mainland.

Eisenhower declined to take political risks to deal openly with the experiment in China, but he considered
diplomatic relations and trade with Beijing inevitable. Thus, he and Dulles threatened China but never allowed
Chiang to attack it, rebuffed his request for nuclear warheads and missiles, engaged in diplomatic talks with Beijing,
and explored the possibility of dual representation in the UN, as well as opposing Taipei's use of its veto to keep
Mongolia out. At no point did Eisenhower or Dulles wish to abandon the KMT, but, contrary to common wisdom,
they wanted a more realistic relationship with both Chinas.

As would be the case often in the US-Taiwan relationship, Americans thought to be sympathizers disappointed
Taipei once in office. Dulles never served as an advocate for Taiwan. Instead, he appeared willing to come to terms
with Beijing if Chinese leaders would break with Moscow. Lobbyists and businessmen who staunchly supported
Chiang Kai-shek misled Taipei into believing Washington would be friendlier. So too did the enormous economic
assistance Washington lavished on Taiwan, which helped launch an extraordinary economic boom. Taiwan's
leaders had trouble looking beyond their own agenda and understanding where it converged with or diverged from
US national interests.

• KMT: Kuomintang.
  grudgingly: very unwillingly.
  unchastened: not chastened, not modest, not restrained.
  bestow: to give someone something of great value or importance.
  jettison: to throw things away, to get rid of something.
  commando raids: a short attack by soldiers who are specially trained.
  ire: anger.
  howitzers: a heavy gun for firing shells.